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1 Introduction
Over the last decades a much more complete and accurate picture of the Industrial Revolution has
emerged on account of detailed data-oriented work by economic historians. Whereas this picture is
complex, a number of aspects stand out. First, cost-reducing technological innovation implemented
by individuals and rms was essential to industrialization (Landes, 1969, Mokyr, 1990). Second,
innovation in consumer products was nearly as common as innovation in production processes, with
this Consumer Revolution preceding the Industrial Revolution (Styles, 2000, Berg, 2002). Third,
improving transportation infrastructure, together with a favorable geography, turned Britain into
an increasingly integrated marketplace (Szostak, 1991). Fourth, the great inventions of the 18th
century were preceded, and later accompanied, by an organizational shift from the cottage industry
and putting-out system to the centralized workplace (Szostak, 1989, Berg, 1994).
Although historical work has illuminated the nature of the Industrial Revolution, its causes
remain, in the words of Clark (2003), one of historys great mysteries.1 This paper attempts
to demystify the Industrial Revolution by putting forth a novel theory that is consistent with
the picture provided by economic historians. In this theory, a gradual expansion of the market,
coupled with increasing variety of consumer goods and growing rm size, sows the seeds for process
innovation, which allows the economy to transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth.
We show that our theory is empirically plausible by deriving its quantitative implications in a
model calibrated to the historical record of England over the 1300-2000 period and by providing
micro-evidence for the mechanism that underlies it.
The key mechanism in our theory links market size to innovation through the price elasticity
of demand. A larger market allows an economy to sustain a greater variety of goods, making them
more substitutable and increasing their price elasticity of demand. As a result, mark-ups drop and
competition toughens so that rms must become larger to break even. This facilitates innovation,
as bigger rms can spread the xed costs of R&D over a greater quantity of output. Therefore,
only after the market reaches a critical size and competition is strong enough, does innovation
endogenously take o¤ and do living standards rise. An evolution of markets is thus a precondition
for a revolution of industry.
We generate this elasticity e¤ect by embedding Lancaster (1979) preferences into a model of
product and process innovation. The Lancaster construct, based on Hotellings (1929) spatial model
1This is also the implicit conclusion of Mokyr and Voth (2007) in reviewing the theories of the Industrial Revolution.
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of horizontal di¤erentiation, assumes that each household has an ideal variety of an industrial good,
identied by its location on the unit circle. As goods ll up the circle, neighboring varieties become
closer substitutes, implying a higher price elasticity of demand and a lower mark-up (Helpman and
Krugman, 1985, Hummels and Lugovskyy, 2005). As shown by Desmet and Parente (2010) in a
static one-sector model, these preferences imply a positive e¤ect of market size on technological
innovation.2
Apart from the preference structure, the model is fairly standard and in some aspects
simpler than alternative models of the Industrial Revolution. In the spirit of Galor and Weil
(2000), it includes a farm sector that produces a subsistence agricultural good, and it assumes that
parents derive utility from having children. However, in contrast to models that emphasize the role
of human capital in economic development, parents do not face a tradeo¤ between the quantity
and the quality of children.3 Instead, there is a time-rearing cost to children that is lower on the
farm than in the city. With these features, the model not only generates a rapid transition from
Malthusian stagnation to modern growth, but also a structural transformation with a declining
agricultural share, and a demographic transition with population growth initially rising with the
advent of industrialization and subsequently falling.
The model works as follows. The subsistence constraint, together with low initial agricul-
tural productivity, implies that the economy starts o¤ with most of its population employed in
agriculture. Given that so few people live and work in the city and given the xed operating cost,
only a small number of industrial varieties are produced, implying that goods are not particularly
substitutable. Mark-ups are high, and hence, rms are small. As a result, rms do not nd it prof-
itable to incur the xed costs of innovation. However, during this Malthusian phase with stagnant
living standards, exogenous increases in agricultural TFP allow for increases in the population and
a larger urban base. Eventually, the population reaches a critical size, making industrial rms su¢ -
ciently large to warrant process innovation. At this point, rms endogenously lower their marginal
costs, and hence, an industrial revolution ensues.
Process innovation in the industrial sector then sets o¤ a demographic transition and a
structural transformation. As incomes rise, both rural and urban households have more children,
2The constructs of Salop (1979), Gali and Zilibotti (1999), Feenstra (2003), and Ottaviano et al. (2005) all generate
this elasticity e¤ect. However, it is not present in the standard Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz construct, although it can be
generated by assuming that rms take into account how their decisions a¤ect the aggregate price level (Yang and
Heijdra, 1993). Our reasons for using Lancaster is that the elasticity e¤ect is intuitive, the construct is analytically
tractable, and it allows for income e¤ects. It is also fairly straightforward to calibrate.
3See, e.g., Becker et al. (1990), Galor, and Weil (2000), and Lucas (2002).
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because household utility is increasing in the number of children. This leads to accelerating pop-
ulation growth: the rst phase of the demographic transition. At the same time, rising incomes
relax the subsistence constraint, implying a structural transformation, with a decreasing agricul-
tural employment share. Since the cost of child rearing is higher in the city, urban households have
lower fertility than their rural counterparts. With an increasing share of people living in the city,
this puts a brake on aggregate fertility. Eventually, this compositional e¤ect dominates the income
e¤ect, and the population growth rate slows down: the second phase of the demographic transition.
In the limit, as living standards continue to rise, the subsistence constraint disappears, and
the economy converges to constant agricultural and industrial shares of economic activity. Under
certain parametric conditions, the population growth rate converges to zero, and the price elasticity
of demand approaches a constant. Firm size ceases to increase, and the rate of innovation becomes
constant. Thus, the economy converges to a modern growth era with a constant positive growth
rate of per capita GDP.
To assess the plausibility of our theory, we calibrate the model to the historical experience
of England from 1300 to 2000. More specically, we restrict the model parameters to match pre-
1700 and post-1950 English observations, and then test the model by examining its predictions
corresponding to the 1700-1950 period. We nd that the model accounts remarkably well for
the main features of Englands experience during this transition period. In particular, it closely
matches Englands growth path, its structural transformation, and its demographic transition. The
quantitative success of the model, together with independent empirical evidence on the elasticity
mechanism provided in Section 2, constitute strong support for our theory.
The literature on the Industrial Revolution is extensive. A number of themes in our theory
echo back to three older branches of this literature. The rst is the Industrial Organization school,
which views the emergence of large rms with supervised production as the key to the Industrial
Revolution. Important contributions to this literature are Mantoux (1928), Pollard (1965) and Berg
(1994). The second is the Social Change School, which equates the Industrial Revolution to the
development of competitive markets. This view is present in the work of Toynbee (1884), Polanyi
(1944) and Thompson (1963). The nal branch of this older literature emphasizes demand side
factors, in particular, the growth of the home market and the development of consumer demand.
Here some of the important papers are Gilboy (1932) and McKendrick (1982).
With respect to the more recent literature, our work is most closely related to unied
growth theory, which analyzes the transition from Malthusian to modern growth within a common
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framework. Some of the important papers in this literature are Kremer (1993), Goodfriend and
McDermott (1995), Galor and Weil (2000), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Lucas (2002), and Galor
and Moav (2003). These theories emphasize very di¤erent mechanisms from ours though. Moreover,
they do not model process innovation in the sense of individual rms spending resources to lower
their marginal costs, nor do they introduce product innovation in the sense of increasing the variety
of consumer goods.4
Our paper also relates to the literature that uses model calibration to gain intuition for the
causes of the Industrial Revolution, particularly, why England was the rst country to transit from
the Malthusian era. Important papers in this literature are Harley and Crafts (2000), Stokey (2001),
Lagerlöf (2003, 2006), and Voightländer and Voth (2006). As these other models are very di¤erent
from ours, they study the e¤ect of a di¤erent set of factors on the timing of Englands takeo¤. In
our experiments, we consider three factors, each of which has been emphasized by other researchers
as being important for Englands Industrial Revolution: agriculture productivity (Schultz, 1968,
Diamond, 1997), institutions (North and Thomas, 1973, North and Weingast, 1989), and trade
(Findlay and ORourke, 2007). Our counterfactuals support the view that each of these factors was
important for Englands development, perhaps hastening its industrialization by several centuries.
In our theory population size and xed costs are important determinants of the timing of
industrialization. Recently, the empirical relevance of these factors has been questioned by economic
historians. Crafts (1995), for example, has criticized population-based theories on account that
bigger countries have not grown faster, and both Mokyr (1999) and Mokyr and Voth (2007) have
argued against xed costs on account that most industries in the 18th century were characterized
by small rms.
Regarding the population size criticism, we note that in our theory market size, and not
population size per se, is the key determinant of an economys takeo¤.5 While the size of the market
depends on a countrys total population, it is also a¤ected by transport costs, internal and external
trade barriers, and institutions. France clearly had a greater population than England at the start
of the 18th century, but evidence in the form of price variations (Shiue and Keller, 2007) and
transport costs (Szostak, 1991) strongly suggest that markets in England were much more national
4Although some models, such as Goodfriend and McDermott (1995) and Voigtländer and Voth (2006), allow for
increasing variety of intermediate goods to capture Smiths (1776) hypothesis that the Industrial Revolution was the
consequence of greater specialization, nal goods producers continue to be perfectly competitive. As a result, these
models not only fail to generate an increasing number of consumer commodities, they are also unable to account for
the xed costs of technology adoption, and for the growing size of rms before and during the Industrial Revolution
5Recent work by Alesina et al. (2004) suggests that size is important for closed economies.
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in scope.6 Regarding the xed cost criticism, note that in our theory xed costs need not be large,
and therefore, rms need not be particularly large either. Moreover, the xed costs of innovation
are not limited to those incurred by the original inventor; they also refer to the resources used to
adapt a workshop or factory to a new production process. Historically, an important xed cost
associated with technology adoption was the cost of overcoming worker resistance (Mokyr, 1990).
Also consistent with the existence of xed adoption costs, Sokolo¤ (1984) reports that during the
rst half of the 19th century rms in the U.S. were largest in those areas where mechanization had
proceeded fastest.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides empirical support for
the mechanism put forth in this paper, and hence serves as motivation. Section 3 describes the
model and characterizes the optimal decisions of agents. Section 4 denes the equilibrium and
shows algebraically that under certain conditions the economy converges to a balanced growth
path. Section 5 calibrates the model to the historical experience of England, and considers how
agricultural productivity, institutions, and trade a¤ected the date of the economys take-o¤. Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 Empirical Motivation
In this section we motivate our theory by presenting empirical evidence for the underlying mech-
anism by which greater market size leads to more innovation. This mechanism relies on increased
variety of consumer goods raising the price elasticity of demand. In response to this change, mark-
ups fall, implying larger rms. The increase in rm size, then, strengthens the incentives of rms to
lower their marginal costs. Thus, in what follows, we document secular trends in product variety,
price elasticity of demand, mark-ups, rm size, and process innovation.
Product innovation Consistent with the historical record, our model leads to both product and
process innovation. A growing body of literature argues that product innovation was every bit
as important to the Industrial Revolution as process innovation. The creation of new consumer
goods, and the increase in varieties, was an essential feature of the Industrial Revolution and the
period leading up to it. Berg (2002), for example, in analyzing the nature of British patents for
6China is another relevant comparison. Kelly (1997) suggests that Chinas growth during the Sung Dynasty (9th
through 12th centuries) was the result of a creation of a national waterway network that expanded markets. For
the Qing Dynasty (17th and 18th centuries) the population of Chinas most vibrant region, the Lower Yangtze, did
not change much despite overall population growth in the country, and the regions institutions became worse for
business according to Ma (2006).
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the period 1627-1825 in a subset of industries, including metal wares, glass, ceramics, furniture and
watches, found that over one-quarter of the 1,610 patents specied new products or variations of
existing ones. In a narrower study, Gri¢ ths et al. (1992) document that roughly half of the 166
patented and non-patented improvements in the textile industry between 1715 and 1800 concerned
product innovation. Similarly, De Vries (1993), using records from probate inventories, documents
increasing variety in household durables through the 18th century, despite relatively stagnant wages.
The increase in new consumer goods and varieties is not a post 17th century phenomenon.
Weatherwill (1988) argues that the Consumer Revolution peaked between 1680 and 1720. Referring
to the 1500-1700 period, Styles (2000) lists a number of products that were either entirely English
inventions or dramatic remodeled goods from other societies, such as pocket microscopes, drinking
cups made from lead glass, and watches. Other new products for English consumers, such as
Delftware plates, Venetian glass, and upholstered chairs, originated in Europe. Still others, such
as porcelain, tea, tobacco, sugar, lacquered cabinets, and painted calicos, came from Asia and the
New World.
Price elasticity of demand. Our mechanism is based on larger markets generating higher price
elasticities of demand. The most direct support for our theory would be evidence of a secular rise
in the price elasticity of demand. Unfortunately, time series estimates for the price elasticity of
individual products do not exist. Even in the cross-section, such estimates are uncommon. We
know of only two such studies, both consistent with our model. These are Barron et al. (2008) who
compute price elasticities in U.S. gasoline markets and nd that larger markets are associated with
more elastic demand, and Hummels and Lugovskyy (2005) who document that import demand in
larger markets is more responsive to changes in trade costs.
Mark-ups. Our mechanism implies a secular decline in mark-ups associated with the increase in
the price elasticity of demand as markets expand. Estimates of mark-ups are more readily available,
although most studies are contemporary. Short-run studies in the context of business cycles and
trade liberalizations strongly suggest that the mark-up is inversely related to market size. Within
the trade literature, Tybout (2003) documents that mark-ups generally fall following liberalization,
and within the business cycle literature, Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) and Chevalier et al.
(2003) nd that mark-ups are countercyclical both at the aggregate and the industry level. To our
knowledge, there is only one long-run study on mark-ups. Ellis (2006) estimates mark-ups in the
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United Kingdom for the period 1870-2003 and nds a 67 percent decline in this 134 year period.
Taken together, these studies support the negative relation between market size and mark-ups
implied by our mechanism.
Firm size. Another implication of our mechanism is that rm size increases with market size.
Here, studies are much more abundant, and supportive. There is a large and extensive literature
that documents increases in establishment size since industrialization for both England and the
United States. For example, Lloyd-Jones and Le Roux (1980) document that the median number
of workers in cotton rms in Manchester more than tripled between 1815 and 1841. In the case
of pig iron, Feinstein and Pollard (1988) report that in England production per furnace increased
from 400 tons in 1750 to 550 in 1790. Using data from the U.S. Census of Manufacturing, Sokolo¤
(1984) and Atack et al. (1999) nd more of the same in manufacturing industries over the 19th
century, while Granovetter (1984) documents this pattern continued into the 20th Century.
Sokolo¤s (1984) study is particularly relevant because it shows that an increase in rm
size was occurring prior to 1860, considered the starting year of the US Industrial Revolution. In
addition, he nds that rms also grew in size in industries that did not mechanize, such as tanning,
hats, boots and shoes. This is consistent with our theory, which predicts that the increase in
rm size predates the economys take-o¤. The Sokolo¤ study further supports our mechanism by
uncovering a positive correlation between market size, rm size, and the level of industrialization.
More densely populated areas had larger rms within a given industry. For example, in the wool
textiles industry in 1850 average rm size was 38.7 in New England, compared to 14.5 in the
Mid Atlantic, and 6.5 in the rest of the country. Additionally, more densely populated areas
industrialized rst. Finally, whereas artisan shops coexisted with factories during the rst half of
the 19th century, artisan shops were located in rural areas with low population density and high
transportation costs.
There do not seem to be hard numbers of rm size in England predating the Industrial
Revolution. Nevertheless, a burgeoning literature on proto-industrialization suggests that rm size
increased substantially before the onset of Englands takeo¤. Proto-industrialization refers to the
period between 1500 and 1700, when non-agricultural goods were produced in the countryside
for large regional, and even international, markets. It is associated with the rise of the putting-out
system, consisting of merchant capitalists who would sell inputs to rural households and buy nished
good in return. Under this system merchants controlled and centralized a number of activities,
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such as marketing and nance, whereas production was decentralized to rural households. If one
interprets the putting-out network as an organization, then the size of organizations was clearly
increasing before the Industrial Revolution. The only di¤erence, compared to the factory system,
is that not all tasks were performed under the same roof.
Some centralization of production did occur in this period, however, although it tended to
be limited to specic parts of the production process. For example, in the cotton industry spinning
became mechanized and centralized, when weaving was still being done by cottage industries.
Similarly, the printing of fabrics became centralized early on. Calico printing workshops were
proto-factories, and some of the leading calico printers were associated with the introduction of
mechanized spinning and weaving. In the woolen industry, the artisan system was retained by
clothiers using cooperative mills that centralized part of the production process. In the knitting
industry, apart from sophisticated putting out networks, the industry boasted centralized workshops
from early in the eighteenth century. Large workshops employing over forty parish apprentices
existed in Nottingham as early as the 1720s. By the time that Hargreaves and Arkwright went to
Nottingham, the concentration of labor in factories was a fairly familiar idea (Berg, 1994).
Many researchers, particularly Mendels (1972), argue that the rise of the cottage industry
was a critical step in the eventual industrialization of the British economy. Indeed, Mendels claims
that the proto-industrialization period was a critical transition phase from the feudal world of the
Middle Ages to the capitalist world of the modern era. Our work compliments this area of research.
In our theory increases in rm size not only predate the start of the Industrial Revolution, they are
necessary for it to occur.
Firm size and process innovation. Lastly, the nal link in our mechanism is the one from
rm size to process innovation. The idea that rm size facilitates process innovation has a long
history in economics, going back as far as Schumpeter (1942). There is much empirical evidence
supporting this view. For example, Atack et al. (2008) nd that larger rms were more likely to
use steam power in the 19th century. Hannan and McDowell (1984) reach a similar conclusion
when analyzing the relationship between the size of banks and the adoption of ATMs in the 1970s.
In terms of R&D expenditures, Cohen and Klepper (1996) nd that they rise with rm size, with
a greater share being allocated to process innovation.7
7Taken together, Sokolo¤ (1984) showing that rms were larger in larger markets, and Sokolo¤ (1988) showing
that patenting activity was greater in larger markets, support the positive link between rms size and innovation.
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3 The Model
In this section we describe the structure of the model economy. The economy consists of one country,
with a rural and an urban area, and zero transportation costs.8 Time is discrete and innite. There
are three sectors: a farm sector, an industrial sector, and a household sector. The farm sector is
perfectly competitive and produces a single non-storable consumption good. The farm technology
uses labor and land and is subject to exogenous technological change. The industrial sector is
monopolistically competitive and produces a nite set of di¤erentiated goods, each of which has a
unique address on the unit circle. There is both product and process innovation in the industrial
sector. The household sector consists of one-period lived agents, each of whom derives utility
from consumption of the agricultural good, consumption of the di¤erentiated industrial goods, and
children. For each household, there is a variety of the di¤erentiated good that it prefers above all
others. Households earn income by either working in the farm sector or the industrial sector. In
addition to working, households use their time to rear children, who constitute the household sector
in the next period. In what follows we describe the model structure and the relevant optimization
problems encountered by agents in each sector.
3.1 Household Sector
Endowments. At the beginning of period t there is a measure Nt of households. Each household
is endowed with one unit of time, which it uses to rear children and to work in either the farm
or the industrial sector. There are no barriers to migration, so that a household is free to work
in either sector. Denote by Nft and N
x
t the measure of households employed in agriculture and
industry. Thus,
Nt = N
f
t +N
x
t : (1)
Both types of households are uniformly distributed around the unit circle.
Preferences. A household derives utility from the number of children it raises, nt, consumption
of the agricultural good, cat, and consumption of the di¤erentiated industrial goods, fcvtgv2Vt ,
where Vt denotes the set of di¤erentiated goods produced at time t. Following the literature on
the structural transformation and the demographic transition, each household has an agricultural
8A richer version would allow for multiple countries and transportation (or trade) costs. Although this would
allow us to analyze the e¤ect of a reduction in transportation (or trade) costs, it would come at the cost of increased
analytical complexity.
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subsistence constraint, represented by ca in the utility function. Departing from the literature on
the demographic transition, we assume that household utility does not depend on the quality of
children.
A household located at point ~v on the unit circle has the following Cobb-Douglas preferences:
U~v(cat; nt; fcvtgv2Vt) = [(cat   ca)1 [g(cvtjv 2 Vt)]](nt)1 ; (2)
where
g(cvtjv 2 Vt) = max
v2Vt
[
cvt
1 + dv~v
]: (3)
The subutility g(cvtjv 2 Vt) follows Lancaster (1979) by assuming that each household has a variety
of the di¤erentiated good that it prefers above all others. This ideal variety corresponds to the
households location on the unit circle, ~v. The further away an industrial variety v lies from a
households ideal variety, the lower the utility it derives from consuming a unit of variety v. In
particular, the quantity of variety v that gives the household the same utility as one unit of its
ideal variety ~v is 1 + dv~v, where dv~v denotes the shortest arc distance between v and ~v, and  > 0
is a parameter that determines how fast a households utility diminishes with the distance from its
ideal variety.9
Demographics. Households live for one period. Let nit denote the number of children of a
household that is employed in sector i 2 ff; xg.10 The law of motion for the population is then
Nt+1 = n
f
tN
f
t + n
x
tN
x
t : (4)
There is a time cost of rearing children, denoted by  i, that depends on the sector i 2 ff; xg
in which the household works. We assume that this time cost is higher in the city than in the
countryside, i.e., x   f . This assumption is important for generating the second phase of the
demographic transition, characterized by a declining population growth rate. It is consistent with
the the historical record. Jones and Tertilt (2006), for example, report that the number of chil-
dren per woman was higher in non-urban areas and on farms throughout the 19th century, and
Williamson (1985) reports that the natural rate of increase for the urban population in 19th century
England was lower than in the countryside. The reasons for these regional fertility and population
9The expression 1 + dv~v is known as Lancasters compensation function.
10We need not index the number of children by a households location on the unit circle because the fertility choice
is independent of location. This is also the case for the agricultural good.
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di¤erences are multiple. For one, infant mortality was higher in the city on account of unhealthy
living conditions, a problem that persisted in the United States until the 1920s and the advent of
urban sanitation systems. For another, laws restricting child labor in 19th century England applied
only to factory work (Doepke and Zilibotti 2005). 11
Utility Maximization. The di¤erential cost of rearing children in the city and on the farm
implies that household income will be di¤erent across sectors in equilibrium, even though households
are free to move at the beginning of the period. We therefore distinguish between an agricultural
households income per unit of time worked, yft , and an industrial households income per unit of
time worked, yxt . The budget constraint of a household working in sector i 2 ff; xg is then
yit(1   init)  ciat +
X
v2V
pvtc
i
vt (5)
Maximizing (2) subject to (5) yields the following rst order necessary conditions:
ciat = (1  )(yit   ca) + ca (6)X
v2Vt
pvtc
i
vt = (y
i
t   ca) (7)
 init = (1  )(1 
ca
yit
) (8)
We make assumptions on the technology parameters to ensure that yit(1   init) > ca for all t  0.
To further characterize the optimal consumption of the di¤erentiated goods, we exploit the
linearity property of the subutility function (3) with respect to the set of di¤erentiated goods.
This implies that each agent consumes a single industrial variety. In particular, an agent buys
the variety, v0 2 Vt; that minimizes the cost of an equivalent unit of its ideal variety, pvt(1 + dv~v).
Namely,
v0 = argmin[pvt(1 + d

v;~v)jv 2 Vt]: (9)
Using (7), a household with ideal variety ~v working in sector i therefore buys the following quantity
of variety v0:
civ0t =
(yit   ca)
pv0t
(10)
Its demand for all other varieties v 2 Vt is zero.
11Another reason is that it was possible to simultaneously watch children and tend vegetables in the countryside,
but not in the city, where factory work dominated. Of course, the higher number of children in rural areas may also
have been due to them being able to work more easily on the farm than in the factory (Rosenzweig and Evensen,
1977, Doepke, 2004). In our model, however, children do not participate in the labor force.
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3.2 Industrial Sector
The industrial sector is monopolistically competitive, and produces a set of di¤erentiated goods,
each with a unique address on the unit circle. As in Lancaster (1979), rms can costlessly relocate
on the unit circle. The technology for producing industrial goods uses labor as its only input. The
existence of a xed cost, which takes the form of labor, gives rise to increasing returns. Each rm
chooses its price and technology, taking aggregate variables and the choices of other rms as given.
There is free entry and exit, so that the number of rms, and varieties, will adjust to ensure all
rms make zero prots.
Production. Let Qvt be the quantity of variety v produced by a rm; Lvt the units of labor it
employs; Avt its technology level, or production process; and vt its xed cost in terms of labor.
Then the output in period t of the rm producing variety v is
Qvt = Avt[Lvt   vt] (11)
Both the xed labor cost, vt, and the technology level, Avt, depend on the rms rate of process
innovation, gvt. In particular, the xed labor cost is given by
vt = e
gvt : (12)
Thus, there are two components to the xed cost: an innovation cost, represented by egvt , that is
increasing in the size of process innovation, gvt, on account that  > 0, and an operating cost, ,
that is incurred even if there is no process innovation. The rms technology level, Avt, is given by
Avt = (1 + gvt)Axt; (13)
where Axt is the benchmark technology in period t, taken to be the average technology used by
industrial rms in period t  1:
Axt =
X
v2Vt 1
1
mt 1
Av;t 1; (14)
where mt 1 is the number of varieties produced in period t  1, i.e., mt 1 = card(Vt 1). Therefore,
if gvt = 0, so there is no process innovation, a rm uses the industrial benchmark technology, Axt,
whereas if gvt > 0, the rm uses a technology that is (1 + gvt) times greater than the benchmark
technology.12
12Thus, we assume complete intertemporal knowledge spillovers. While the existence of this spillover implies a
dynamic ine¢ ciency, it is not important to the points we wish to establish. We make the assumption because it is
12
Prot Maximization. The xed operating cost implies that each variety, regardless of the
technology used, will be produced by a single rm. In maximizing its prots, each rm behaves non-
cooperatively, taking the choices of other rms as given. Prot maximization determines the price
and quantity to be sold, the number of workers to be hired, and the technology to be operated. As
is standard in models of monopolistic competition, rms take all aggregate variables in the economy
as given.13
Using (11), the prots of the rm producing variety v, vt, can be written as
vt = pvtCvt   wxt[egvt + Cvt
Axt(1 + gvt)
]; (15)
where wxt is the wage in the industrial sector, and pvt is the price of variety v.
The problem of the rm producing variety v is to choose (pvt; gvt) to maximize (15), subject
to the aggregate demand for its product, Cvt. As usual, the prot maximizing price is a markup
over the marginal unit cost wxt=[Axt(1 + gvt)], so that
pvt =
wxt
Axt(1 + gvt)
"vt
"vt   1 ; (16)
where "vt is the price elasticity of demand for variety v:
"vt =  @Cvt
@pvt
pvt
Cvt
:
The rst order necessary condition associated with the choice of technology, gvt, is
 egvt + Cvt
Axt(1 + gvt)2
 0; (17)
where the strict inequality case in the above expression corresponds to a corner solution, i.e.,
gvt = 0.
3.3 Farm Sector
The farm sector is perfectly competitive. Farms produce a single, non-storable consumption good,
that serves as the economys numéraire. The farm technology is constant returns to scale, and uses
labor and land. There is a measure one of farms.
not possible to solve for an equilibrium with asymmetric rms using Lancasters construct. Without the assumption
of complete intertemporal knowledge spillovers, new varieties would start out at a lower technology, and hence there
would not be a symmetric equilibrium.
13 In principle this requires rms to be of measure zero, a condition that is not satised. See Desmet and Parente
(2010) for a discussion of how rms could be made of measure zero, without changing any of the results.
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Production. Let Qat denote the quantity of agricultural output of the stand-in farm, and Lat the
corresponding agricultural labor input. Without loss of generality, we normalize the land owned by
the stand-in farm to 1. The production function is Cobb-Douglas in land and labor with a labor
share of 1   > 0, namely,
Qat = AatL

at (18)
Agricultural TFP, Aat, grows at a rate gat > 0 during period t, so that
Aat+1 = Aat(1 + gat): (19)
During the Malthusian phase agricultural TFP grows at a constant exogenous rate, a > 0.
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However, once the industrial sector starts innovating, we allow for agricultural TFP growth to
accelerate. In particular, we assume that
gat = maxfa;
Axt  Axt 1
Axt 1
g (20)
This assumption is meant to capture the large secular rise in the growth rate of agricultural TFP
since the Industrial Revolution, as documented by Federico (2006). Implicitly, it reects the im-
portance of innovations in the form of farm equipment and synthetic fertilizers originating in the
industrial sector.15
Prot Maximization. The prot maximization problem of farms is straightforward, as they are
price takers. The prot of the stand-in farm is
at = AatLat
   watLat (21)
where wat is the agricultural wage rate. Farms choose Lat to maximize equation (21). This yields
the standard rst order condition
wat = Aat(Lat)
 1: (22)
Total prots (or land rents) are thus,
at = (1  )Aat(Lat) (23)
14To be consistent with the historical record of a slowly increasing population during the pre-industrial era, agri-
cultural TFP growth must be positive if there are decreasing returns to land.
15Alternatively, though at the cost of substantial complexity, the same qualitative results could be obtained by
having farms use industrial goods as intermediate inputs, rather than assuming that agricultural TFP growth depends
on technological progress in the industrial sector. As technological improvement in industry lowers the relative price
of industrial goods, farms would use more industrial intermediate inputs, thereby increasing farm labor productivity.
Results for this setup are available from the authors upon request.
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and prots per unit of time worked, at, are
at = (1  )Aat(Lat) 1: (24)
Prots (or land rents) are rebated to the farm households in proportion to their time worked.
Hence, total income of a farm household per unit of time worked is the sum of wages per unit of
time worked and prots per unit of time worked:
yft = Aat(Lat)
 1 (25)
Urban households, therefore, do not receive any farm prots. Their income per unit of time worked
is
yxt = wxt (26)
4 Equilibrium
As is standard in this literature, we focus exclusively on symmetric Nash equilibria. In such an
equilibrium, all rms use the same technology, charge the same price, and are equally spaced around
the unit circle. This section denes a symmetric Nash equilibrium for our economy, and explores
the limiting properties of the equilibrium. It consists of three parts. In the rst part, we derive
the aggregate demand for each good in the symmetric case, and use this to simplify the rst order
prot maximization conditions. In the second part, we dene a symmetric equilibrium. In the
last part, we establish a set of parametric restrictions that ensure that the economy converges to a
balanced growth path.
4.1 Aggregate Demand
We rst determine the aggregate demand for each industrial good. Demand comes from both types
of households. Since in a symmetric Nash equilibrium all varieties produced are equally spaced
around the unit circle, aggregate demand for a given variety depends only on the locations and the
prices of its closest neighbors to its right and its left on the unit circle. Let dt denote the distance
between two neighboring varieties in period t. This distance is inversely proportional to the number
of varieties, mt, namely,
dt =
1
mt
: (27)
Since the nearest competitors to the right and to the left of the rm producing variety v are each
located at the same distance dt from it, we do not need to di¤erentiate between them, and thus
denote each competitor by vc and their prices by pct.
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To begin, we derive the aggregate demand of agricultural households for variety v. The rst
step is to identify the location of the household on the unit circle that is indi¤erent between buying
variety v and variety vc. Recall that each household will buy that variety for which the unit cost of
an equivalent unit of its ideal variety is lowest. Thus, the agricultural household that is indi¤erent
between buying varieties v and vc is the one whose cost of a quantity equivalent to one unit of its
ideal variety in terms of v equals the cost of a quantity equivalent to one unit of its ideal variety
in terms of vc. Consequently, the agricultural household that is indi¤erent between v and vc is the
one located at distance dvt from v, where
pct[1 + (d  dvt) ] = pvt[1 + dvt]: (28)
Given this indi¤erence condition applies to agricultural households both to the right and to the left
of v, the uniform distribution of agricultural households around the unit circle implies that a share
2dvt of them consumes variety v. Since each household spends (y
f
t   ca) on the industrial good,
the total demand for v by agricultural households is
Cfvt = 2dvtN
f
t c
f
vt =
2dvtN
f
t (y
f
t   ca)
pvt
: (29)
By analogy, total demand by industrial households is
Cxvt = 2dvtN
x
t c
x
vt =
2dvtN
x
t (y
x
t   ca)
pvt
: (30)
Given that all rms are spaced evenly in the symmetric equilibrium, it follows that
2dvt = dt: (31)
Aggregate demand for variety v, Cvt, is the sum of (29) and (30). Hence,
Cvt = dt(N
f
t c
f
vt +N
x
t c
x
t ) =
dt(y
f
t N
f
t + y
x
tN
x
t  Ntca)
pvt
(32)
With this demand in hand, we can solve for the price elasticity in a symmetric Nash equi-
librium. This involves three steps. First, from (32) it is easy to show that
 @Cv
@pv
p v
Cv
= 1  @dv
@pv
pv
dv
(33)
Next, by taking the total derivative of the indi¤erence equation (28) with respect to pvt, we solve
for @dvt=@pvt, and substituting this partial derivative in (33) yields
"vt = 1 +
[1 + dv ]pv
[pvd
 1
v + pc(d  dv) 1]d v
(34)
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Finally, we invoke symmetry, i.e., pvt = pct and 2dvt = dt, so that (34) reduces to
"vt = 1 +
1
2
(
2
dt
) +
1
2
(35)
Thus, as the number of varieties increases, the price elasticity of demand increases.
Aggregate demand for the agricultural good is easy to determine. Individual households
demand, (6), implies that aggregate demand is
Cat = (1  )(yft Nft + yxtNxt  Ntca) +Ntca (36)
4.2 Symmetric Equilibrium
We next dene a symmetric Nash Equilibrium for our economy. Because the decisions of house-
holds, industrial rms and farms are all static, the dynamic equilibrium for the model economy
is essentially a sequence of static equilibria that are linked through the laws of motion for the
population, the benchmark technology in the industrial sector, and TFP in the farm sector.
As is standard, the equilibrium must satisfy prot maximization, utility maximization, and
market clearing conditions. It must also be the case that each household is indi¤erent between
working in the farm sector and working in the industrial sector. More specically, for a household
with ideal variety v the utility associated with consumption and children should be the same across
sectors:
U(cfvt; c
f
at; n
f
t ) = U(c
x
vt; c
x
at; n
x
t ): (37)
Another condition requires that rms in the industrial sector earn zero prots in equilibrium. This
is a consequence of there being free entry. Thus,
pvtQvt   wxt[egvt + Qvt
Axt(1 + gvt)
] = 0 (38)
This condition e¤ectively determines the number of varieties and the distance between varieties.
The zero prot condition (38), together with mark-up equation (16) and the elasticity
equation in the symmetric equilibrium (35), provide the key to understanding the positive relation
between market size and rm size. From the elasticity expression (35) it is apparent that as
the number of varieties increases, and the distance between rms decreases, the price elasticity
of demand increases. This result is easy to understand: by increasing the number of varieties,
the unit circle becomes more crowded, making neighboring varieties more substitutable. From the
price expression (16), it follows that the greater elasticity leads to tougher competition, reducing the
markup. The zero prot condition (38) then implies that the size of rms, in terms of production,
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must increase: given the same xed cost, a rm must sell a greater quantity of units in order to
break even. As we will see later, larger rms nd it easier to bear the xed cost of innovation,
leading to a positive relation between market size and technological progress.
We now dene the dynamic Symmetric Equilibrium.
Denition of Symmetric Equilibrium. A Symmetric Equilibrium is a sequence of household
variables fcfvt; cfat; nft ; yft ; Nft ; cxvt; cxat; nxt ; yxt ; Nxt g, a sequence of farm variables fQat; Lat; atg, a se-
quence of industrial rm variables fQvt; Lvt; pvt; gvt; "vt; Avtg, and a sequence of aggregate variables
fVt; wxt;mt; wat; dt; Nt; Axt; Aatg that satisfy
(i) utility maximization conditions given by (6), (7) and (8).
(ii) farm prot maximization conditions given by equations (18), (22), (24) and (25).
(iii) industrial prot maximization conditions given by (11), (13), (12), (26), (16), (17), and (35)
(iv) market clearing conditions
(a) industrial goods market: equation (11) = equation (32)
(b) industrial labor market:
mtLvt = N
x
t (1  xnxt ) (39)
(c) farm goods market: equation (18) = equation (36)
(d) farm labor market:
Lat = N
f
t (1   fnft ) (40)
(v) aggregate laws of motion for Axt given by (14); for Nt given by (4); and for Aat given by (19)
and (20)
(vi) zero prot condition of industrial rms given by (38)
(vii) indi¤erence condition of households given by (37)
(viii) population feasibility given by (1)
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4.3 Properties
We conclude this section by addressing the limiting properties of the model, namely, whether the
economy converges to a balanced growth path. We do this because economic growth in the leading
industrialized nations has been fairly constant over the 20th century.
Proposition 1. The economy converges to a balanced growth path with constant technological
progress in industry provided that (i) (1 
f
  1)(1  )( 
x
f
)
1 
 + (1 
f
  1) = 0, (ii) gat > 0 for all t,
and (iii)  is su¢ ciently close to 1.
Proof. We start by recalling three equilibrium conditions: at all times utility should be equal across
farming and industrial households,
(yft   ca)(
1  ca=yft
 f
)1  = (yxt   ca)(
1  ca=yxt
x
)1  (41)
and income should equal expenditure in both sectors,
yft N
f
t (1   fnft ) = (1  )(yft Nft + yxtNxt ) + (1  (1  ))ca(Nft +Nxt ) (42)
yxtN
x
t (1  xnxt ) = (yft Nft + yxtNxt )  ca(Nxt +Nxt ): (43)
We now show that yft in the limit goes to innity. To do so, it su¢ ces to show that the
growth in yft is strictly positive in each period. Since y
f
t = AatL
 1
at , this amounts to showing that
gat   (1  )
_Lat
Lat
> 0: (44)
Expression (8) implies that population growth is nite, and therefore growth in the hours worked
in agriculture is also nite, so that if  is close enough to 1, expression (44) is satised.
Since  f > x, condition (41) implies that if yft goes to innity in the limit, then y
x
t also
goes to innity in the limit. This, in turn, implies that in the limit both types of households have
a constant (though di¤erent) number of kids:
ni =
1  
 i
(45)
where i 2 ff; xg. As the number of children is constant in the limit, the utility indi¤erence condition
(41) implies that
yf
yx
= (
 f
x
)
1 
 : (46)
Moreover, if we divide equation (42) by (43), it follows that in the limit
yfNf
yxNx
=
1  

: (47)
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Substituting (46) into (47) then gives the following limit expression:
Nf
Nx
=
1  

(
x
 f
)
1 
 : (48)
Thus, the shares of agricultural and industrial households converge to xed numbers. This together
with (45), implies that in the limit population growth is constant. Substituting (48) and (45) into
the expression for population growth, (nf 1)Nf=N+(nx 1)Nx=N gives the following expression:
(
1  
 f
  1)
1 
 (
x
f
)
1 

1 + 1  (
x
f
)
1 

+ (
1  
x
  1) 1
1 + 1  (
x
f
)
1 

(49)
Therefore, if (1 
f
  1)(1  )( 
x
f
)
1 
 +(1 
f
  1) = 0, as stated in condition (ii), population growth
converges to zero. With a constant population, a constant number of children in each sector, and a
constant share of households employed in the industrial sector in the limit, it follows that the total
number of hours worked in industry also converges to a constant.
It is now easy to show that in the limit gv is a constant. The case where gv = 0 is
trivial. Thus, we focus on the case of an interior solution. The zero prot condition, Qv =
egvAx(1 + gv)("   1), together with the rst order condition for technological progress, (17),
implies that gv is a positive function of the price elasticity of demand:
gv =
"v   1

  1: (50)
Since the total production of each rm is egvAx(1 + gv)("   1) and the total number of hours
worked in industry is Nx in the limit, it follows that the number of rms is m = Nx=(egv"),
where m = 1=d. Substituting into (35) gives
" = 1 +
1
2
(
2Nx
egv"
) +
1
2
: (51)
Now re-write (51) as
2"+1   (2 + 1)"   (2Nx=egv) = 0 (52)
and take the total derivative of this expression with respect to gv. This yields
@"
@gv
=   (2N
x) e gv
2( + 1)"t   (2 + 1)" 1
: (53)
From (35) we know that " > 1, so that this derivative (53) is strictly negative. Given that (51)
implies that " is decreasing in gv and (50) implies that " is increasing in gv, and given that Nx
is constant in the limit, there is a unique, and constant, gv, and thus a unique, and constant, ".
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Therefore, if Nx is constant, gv is also constant. The economy therefore converges to a balanced
growth path with constant growth in the industrial sector.
In Proposition 1 we have shown that if population growth converges to zero, the economy
converges to a balanced growth path with constant technological progress in the industrial sector.
(This constant rate of technological progress may be zero.) Next, we show that the rate of techno-
logical progress in the limit is an increasing function of the balanced growth path population, N ,
and a decreasing function of the cost of innovation, .
Proposition 2. Technological progress in the balanced growth path is an increasing function of
population, N , and a decreasing function of the innovation cost parameter, .
Proof. As argued in the proof of Proposition 1, on the balanced growth path, expressions (50) and
(51) determine the rate of technological progress and the price elasticity of demand. Expression
(50) does not depend on Nx, whereas expression (51) does. To see this, re-write (51) as (52) and
totally di¤erentiate, keeping gv xed. This gives
@"
@Nx
=
(2=egv)(Nx) 1
2( + 1)"   (2 + 1)" 1 (54)
Since " > 1, the above partial derivative is strictly positive, so that an increase in Nx leads to a
greater elasticity of demand for any given gv. Recall that expression (50) implies that the elasticity
is upward sloping in gv, whereas expression (51) implies that the elasticity is downward sloping in
gv. This, together with the fact that a greater value of Nx causes an upward shift in expression
(51), allows us to conclude that gv is increasing in Nx. Since Nx is a xed share of N , gv is therefore
also increasing in the size of the population.
To show that gv is decreasing in , we use a similar argument. Re-write (51) as (52) and
totally di¤erentiate with respect to , keeping Nx and gv constant. This gives
@"
@gv
=   (2N
x) gve gv
2( + 1)"   (2 + 1)" 1 (55)
Since " > 1, the above partial derivative is strictly negative, so that an increase in  leads to a
smaller elasticity of demand for any given gv. By analogy with the above argument, this implies
that gv is decreasing in .
The intuition for the positive relation between the size of the limit population and the bal-
anced growth path rate of technological progress is straightforward. A greater population leads to
21
a larger number of households employed in the industrial sector. The greater size of the industrial
sector, and the larger number of varieties produced, implies lower mark-ups, and tougher compe-
tition. To break even, industrial rms must become larger. These larger rms then endogenously
choose to innovate more. This is obvious from the rst order condition on technology choice, (17),
which exhibits two e¤ects: an increase in innovation raises a rms xed cost and lowers its marginal
cost. The rst (negative) e¤ect is independent of rm size, whereas the second (positive) e¤ect is
increasing in rm size. As a result, larger rms innovate more.
Propositions 1 and 2 lead to a number of conclusions. Starting o¤ in a situation with no
technological progress in industry, two situations can arise. If population reaches the critical size
for take-o¤ before population growth converges to zero, we will get an industrial revolution, and
the economy will converge to a balanced growth path with strictly positive technological progress
in industry. However, if population growth converges to zero before that critical size is reached, we
have an industrialization trap, and the industrial sector never innovates. As Proposition 2 suggests,
this industrialization trap becomes increasingly likely, the higher is . This is easy to see when
considering the extreme case of  being innite. Then obviously there will never be any take-o¤.16
5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we calibrate the model to the historical record of England over the period 1300-2000,
and use the calibrated structure to examine how the timing of the industrial revolution is a¤ected
by a number of factors emphasized by other researchers as being important for understanding why
England was the rst country to develop.
5.1 Calibration
The calibration strategy is to assign parameter values so that the model equilibrium is characterized
initially by a Malthusian-like era and in the limit by a modern growth era. Empirically, the key
observations of the Malthusian era targeted in the calibration are: (i) a constant living standard,
(ii) a constant rate of population growth, and (iii) a dominant share of agricultural activity in the
economy. Empirically, the key observations of the modern growth era targeted in the calibration
are: (i) a constant, positive rate of growth of per capita GDP, and (ii) a dominant share of indus-
trial activity in the economy. Theoretically, for the model to generate a modern growth era, the
16We do not call this a development trap because unless we make assumptions that a in equation (21) goes to
zero in the limit, then there will be increases in agricultural output per person in the industrialization trap.
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population growth rate must converge to zero in the limit. This is another key restriction in the
calibration exercise.
Before assigning parameters, it is necessary to identify the empirical counterpart of a model
period, and starting date. Given that households live for one period during which they raise their
o¤spring, it is reasonable to interpret a period as the time that elapses between generations. In
models that employ a two-period generational construct, a period is typically assigned a length of
35 years. However, since our model is one of the last millennium and as life expectancies were far
shorter before the 20th century, we choose 25 years for the period length. The rst model period
is identied with the year 1300. This choice is primarily motivated by data availability.
Table 1: Parameter values
1. Population
N0 = 346 start of industrial revolution in 1750
2. Industrial technology parameters
Ax0 = 1 normalization
 = 3:7 median percentage of ratio of non-production to production work-
ers in US manufacturing outside central o¢ ces (Berman et al.,
1994)
 = 4:5 limiting growth of per capita GDP between 1-5-2.0% (Maddison,
2001)
3. Agricultural technology parameters
Aa0 = 11:11 constant agricultural living standard in pre-1500 era
a = 0:0095 pre-1500 average annual population growth rate of .025% (Mad-
dison, 2001)
 = 0:71 1700 labor share in agriculture estimate (Clark, 2000b, Hayami
and Ruttan, 1971)
4. Preference parameters
ca = 1:55 agricultural share of employment in 1600 (Allen, 2000)
 = 0:98 2% limiting share of agricultures share of employment (Mitchell,
1988)
 = 0:9125 total fertility rate in 2007 for London of 1.80.
 = 0:50 mark-up estimates between 5-15% in the limit (Jaimovich and
Floetotto, 2008)
5. Child rearing parameters
 f = 0:021 zero population growth growth in the limit
x = 0:095 estimates between 7.5-15% per household (de la Croix and Doepke,
2004)
Table 1 lists the parameter values and provides brief comments on how each was assigned.
A few additional words are warranted in the case of some of the parameters. First, the start
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of the Industrial Revolution in the calibration does not correspond to the rst period in which
industrial rms innovate. Instead, it corresponds to the model period(s) that is followed by a
rapid acceleration in the growth rate of per capita GDP and a rapid movement of employment into
industry. This is relevant for how the initial population value is set. Second, the value of the rural
child rearing time cost,  f , is not based on independent estimates of this cost from time-use studies,
but rather is set so population growth is zero in the limit. This restriction implies a time rearing
cost in the countryside that is roughly 25 percent the city level. Although relatively small, it is in
line with estimates by Ho (1979) for rural Philippine households. Finally, the empirical counterpart
of the share of agricultural output that goes to labor, namely, the ratio of total farm wages to the
sum of total farm rents plus total farm wages, has increased steadily over the last four centuries.
Labors share in agriculture was 67 percent in 1600 according to Clark (200b) and 86 percent in
1950 according to Hayami and Ruttan (1971). As the model does not allow for this secular rise,
we set the labor share parameter, , to the 1700 trend-value based on a linear interpolation of the
1600 and 1950 estimates.17
Figures 1-5 present the equilibrium path for the model economy from 1300 to 2000 along ve
dimensions: technological progress in the industrial sector, the growth rate of GDP per capita, the
growth rate of population, agricultures share of employment, and the relative price of industrial
goods. Where appropriate and available, we plot the real world counterparts for the English
economy. Growth rates for both the model economy and England are expressed in annual terms.
Data on the growth rates of GDP per capita and population are taken from Maddison (2001). Data
on the agricultural share of employment are taken from Allen (2000) for the 1300-1800 period, and
thereafter from Mitchell (1988).18 Data on relative prices are taken from Yang and Zhu (2008)
for the 1700-1909 period and extended through 1938 using the Sauerbeck price series in Mitchell
(1988).
In terms of population growth, output growth, and agricultures share of economic activity,
the calibrated model matches the historical experience of the English economy extremely well. We
emphasize that we did not calibrate the model economy to Englands Industrial Revolution: we
calibrated to the pre-1700 Malthusian era, the post-1950 modern growth era, and a starting date
17We have redone the calibration to match the post-1950 estimate, and the equilibrium properties are quantitatively
the same.
18Clark (2002a) also provide estimates for agricultures share of employment for the 1500-1700 period for England.
They are lower than those of Allen (2000), and can be interpreted as a lower bound. Calibrating to Clarks gures is
not a problem. Another alternative is to use the estimates of Allen (2000) for the rural population, rather than the
agricultural population. Those gures provide an upper bound.
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Figure 1: Technological Progress (Benchmark)
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Figure 2: Growth GDP per Capita (Benchmark)
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Figure 3: Growth Population (Benchmark)
Agricultural Employment Share
0.0%
20.0%
40.0%
60.0%
80.0%
100.0%
1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 2100
Year
A
nn
ua
l G
ro
w
th
 R
at
e
Agricultural Share (Model)
Agricultural Share (Data England)
Figure 4: Agricultural Employment Share (Benchmark)
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Figure 5: Relative Price Industrial Goods (Benchmark)
of 1750 for the model economys takeo¤. Thus, the models ability to match the path of Englands
growth rate of per capita GDP, its population growth rate, and its agricultures share of employment
for the period 1750-1950 so closely represent three successful tests of our theory.
The model also does well in its ability to match the behavior of the relative price of indus-
trial goods over the comparable period for which data are available, 1700 to 1938.19 As in the data,
the relative price of industrial goods is essentially cut in half over this period. As can be seen, the
predicted path is non-monotonic. This non-monotonicity reects the behavior of the ratio of the
industrial wage rate to technology, wx=[Ax(1+gv)], which a¤ects the price charged by an industrial
rm as shown in equation (16). This ratio declines throughout much of the transition period from
Malthusian stagnation to modern growth, and then increases slightly before converging to a con-
stant. This pattern arises because the absolute size of the agricultural population initially increases,
then decreases, and eventually stabilizes as the economy converges to a constant population. Be-
cause land is a xed factor, this implies that agricultural household income initially grows slower,
then faster, and eventually at the same rate than technical progress in industry. Since households
must be indi¤erent between working in both sectors, the evolution of industrial household income
19We were not able to extend the British data on relative prices beyond 1938. For the United States, however,
the relative price of manufactured goods has shown no secular trend in the 20th century. This is consistent with the
models prediction of a constant relative price in the balanced growth path.
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is similar: it rst grows more, than less, and eventually at the same rate as technological progress.
This explains the non-monotonic behavior of this ratio, and the relative price of industrial goods.
In terms of other relevant statistics, the calibrated model predicts nearly a 400 percent
increase in rm size, a 300 percent increase in the number of varieties, and a 50 percent decline in
the mark-up over the 1300-2000 period. Where comparable data are available, the model gets the
trends right, but tends to underpredict their magnitudes. For example, in the U.S. economy, the
average size of manufacturing establishments increased by a factor of 5 between 1870 and 1940,
whereas the model predicts a two-fold increase in establishment size over the same period. Likewise,
for the English economy, the mark-up declined by 67 percent between 1870 and 1985 according to
Ellis (2006), whereas the model predicts a 7 percent decline.
In summary, the model does very well at predicting the main features of Englands Industrial
Revolution, in particular, its demographic transition, its structural transformation, and its rate of
growth. It is less successful in its ability to quantitatively match secondary features, such as trends
in rm size, product variety, and mark-ups. Given the rather stark structure of the model and
given the very long and diverse period of analysis, this is not entirely surprising. In light of the
overall success of the model, it is informative to investigate how factors that are likely to di¤er
across societies a¤ect the timing of the industrial revolution. This is the subject we analyze next.
5.2 The Timing of the Industrial Revolution
In this section we explore how certain parameters a¤ect the timing of the industrial revolution.
Since numerous researchers have emphasized the role of agriculture for long run development, we
consider how the start of the industrial revolution is a¤ected by the economys initial level of
agricultural TFP, Aa0, and its growth rate, a. Additionally we examine how the economys take-
o¤ is a¤ected by the xed cost parameters,  and . This we do because operating costs and
R&D costs can be a¤ected by institutions, and because numerous researchers have argued that
institutional developments were critical for Englands economic success. Finally, we examine how
the economys take-o¤ is a¤ected by doubling its initial population, N0, and land endowment. This
experiment aims to capture the e¤ect of trade liberalization, another factor that has been strongly
emphasized in the literature. While we cannot analyze the e¤ect of trade liberalization in the sense
of a small reduction in transportation costs, doubling an economys initial population and land
endowment is equivalent to taking two identical closed economies and completely opening them up
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to trade.20
5.2.1 Agricultural Productivity
How much later would the Industrial Revolution in England have occurred if agricultural produc-
tivity had been lower? Several researchers, such as T.S. Schultz (1968) and Jared Diamond (1997),
have argued that high agricultural productivity is a necessary condition for long-run development.
Towards the goal of answering this question, we conduct two experiments. The rst of these lowers
the value of initial agricultural TFP, Aa0, by 8 percent, whereas the second reduces the growth rate
of agricultural TFP during the pre-industrial period, a, by 26 percent. The results for process
innovation are displayed in Figure 6.21
Not surprisingly, a lower starting level of agricultural TFP delays the onset of the industrial
revolution. Lower agricultural TFP delays the start of industrialization because population size is
smaller in the Malthusian era implying fewer di¤erentiated goods and smaller industrial rms at
any date. The size of the delay, 225 years, associated with the 8 percent decline in agricultural TFP,
may seem surprising, but it is not. With the calibrated growth rate of agricultural TFP of 0.038
percent per annum in the benchmark case, it takes slightly more than 200 years for agricultural
TFP to rise by 8 percent. In other words, the 225 year delay found in this experiment reects
the time it takes agricultural TFP to reach the initial benchmark level. The size of the delay,
however, does suggest that a modest increase in agricultural TFP can be extremely important for
an economys takeo¤.
For similar reasons, a lower rate of agricultural TFP growth also delays the onset of the
industrial revolution. For an annual growth rate of 0.028 percent (instead of 0.038 percent), the
start is only delayed by about 75 years. This shorter delay makes sense: to achieve the same
accumulated growth as with the benchmark TFP growth of 0.038 percent over 200 years takes
about 75 years more with a TFP growth of 0.028 percent.
20We do not consider how the starting date responds to a change in the initial population size alone because such
a change only causes a temporary departure from the Malthusian steady state. Lowering the population by, say, 10
percent has no e¤ect on the start of the industrial revolution because the system returns to its Malthusian steady
state in a few periods.
21 In these experiments, we adjust the initial population so that the economy continues to display a Malthusian era
steady state.
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Figure 6: E¤ect of Lower Agricultural TFP on Timing of Industrial Revolution
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Figure 7: E¤ect of Worse Institutions on Timing of Industrial Revolution
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5.2.2 Policy and Institutions
We next explore how the timing of Englands Industrial Revolution was a¤ected by institutional
factors, a main theme in the research of North and Thomas (1973), North and Weingast (1989),
and Ekelund and Tollison (1981). In the real world, the xed costs rms incur to operate and to
innovate depend to a large extent on institutions and policy. We therefore interpret larger values
for the xed cost parameters,  and , as worse institutions and policies. Recall that  is the
xed cost of operating the benchmark technology, whereas  determines how much the xed cost
increases when better technologies are adopted.
Figure 8 shows what happens when we increase each xed cost parameter separately by
10 percent. In the case of a higher xed operating cost , the industrial revolution is delayed by
100 years; in the case of a 10 percent higher xed adoption cost , the industrial revolution is
delayed by 250 years. While raising either parameter delays the start of the industrial revolution,
the intuition for the delays is di¤erent. In the case of , worse policies or institutions imply less
varieties produced in the economy, meaning the elasticity of demand is lower and innovation is
unprotable. In the case of a 10 percent increase in , the number of varieties and rm size are
una¤ected. However, because the cost of process innovation is higher, rms have to be larger to
nd innovation protable.
Clark (2003) has criticized institutional based theories on account that changes in British
institutions do not time very well with the start of the Industrial Revolution. The Glorious Rev-
olution, of course, occurred in 1688, but the Industrial Revolution did not start for another 100
years. This experiment suggests that Clarks (2003) timing-based argument is not justied. More
to the point, our experiment shows that changes in a countrys institutions that a¤ect operating
and innovation costs are important for the timing of an economys take-o¤, even though the date
of the take-o¤ may lag these changes by several centuries.
5.2.3 Trade
Both international and intranational trade have been identied by numerous authors, such as Find-
lay and ORourke (2006) and Szostak (1991), as being important for Englands early development.
In light of this, we end this section by considering the e¤ect of trade on the timing of take-o¤.
While we modeled the economy as closed, we can analyze the case of going from autarky to free
trade because in our model a doubling of the economys population and land mass is equivalent to
taking two identical closed economies and opening them up to free trade. Although partial trade
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Figure 8: E¤ect of Trade Liberalization on Timing of Industrial Revolution
liberalization in the sense of an incremental reduction in transport costs may be empirically more
relevant, the case of autarky to free trade is, nevertheless, informative and provides an upper bound
of the e¤ect of trade on development.
Figure 9 shows the e¤ect of doubling the countrys size on the technology choice of in-
dustrialized rms. Not surprising, the start of the industrial revolution is dramatically hastened.
Whereas 1525 is the the rst date a rm lowers its marginal cost in the benchmark, 950 is the rst
year of process innovation in the open economy case. This experiment suggests an important role
played by trade in understanding Englands long run development.
6 Conclusion
This paper has put forth a novel theory of the Industrial Revolution that is consistent with the
pattern of long run development documented by economic historians over the last decades. We have
shown that our theory is plausible by calibrating the model to Englands long-run development,
and by providing empirical support primarily at the rm and industrial level for the mechanism
that underlies our theory. We have also examined in the calibrated model the role of various
factors emphasized by other researchers as being important for why England was the rst country
to industrialize. Indeed, a virtue of our theory is that these disparate set of factors all a¤ect the
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date at which the economys industrializes by changing the price elasticity of demand.
Clearly, the novelty of the paper lies in the mechanism by which larger markets bring about
the Industrial Revolution, rather than in the idea that an expansion of markets is critical. Other
economists, such as Adam Smith, have argued that market size was important for understanding
why England was the rst country to experience an industrial revolution. However, Smith and
other economists who have made this point have di¤erent mechanisms in mind that typically
involve increasing returns and specialization. Our mechanism relies on neither.
We see a number of areas where future research will be valuable. On the theoretical side,
we could extend the model economy to allow for savings and capital accumulation. In this way,
the model can be better matched to the data. On the empirical side, we could compute measures
of market potential, that take into account transportation and trade costs, to get better measures
of the e¤ective market size. In this way, we could test the theorys main prediction, that market
size and not national population per se, is the key variable in determining the date an economy
industrializes. Given the success of our theory, these future areas of research are warranted.
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